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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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National Intelligence Officers

29 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Team B Reports on Soviet ICBM Accuracy and Low Altitude
Air Defense

1. Attached are the Team B Reports on Soviet ICBM Accuracy and Soviet Low Altitude Air Defense.

2. I want to caution you -- on behalf of the Director -- that these documents are not for dissemination to consumers of intelligence. The intended audience for the next and final step in the experiment is the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Those recipients, together with the Director, will then provide for an overall assessment of the validity and utility of the experiment.

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Richard Lehman

Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

Attachment

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Remarks:

Attached is proposed response to a question posed during a Department of State press conference on 22 December, forwarded to me for comment. I have proposed the changes noted in red.

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

A/NIO/SP

7-E-62

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27 December 1976

Proposed Response to Question at December 22 Press Conference
Concerning Relationship of National Intelligence Estimates
to State Department Policy Formulation

Department spokesman Fred Brown was asked about the interrelationship of National Intelligence Estimates and State Department policy, and specifically whether the Department was obliged to "abide by the conclusions" of these estimates. Following is a suggested response.

National Intelligence Estimates -- or NIEs -- represent the collective judgment of the agencies making up the intelligence community on important developments abroad, such as Soviet strategic forces and objectives. The Department of State participates in this process, through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

There are several points which might help to clarify the role of the NIEs in the process of policy formulation:

- NIEs represent an effort to project future development abroad. They *DO NOT ANALYZE U.S. POLICY AND* never contain ~~discussions of or~~ recommendations for US policy alternatives.
- To the extent that foreign developments bear on the policy-formulation process, the NIEs obviously constitute an important contribution to the process.
- On the other hand, there are other important inputs to the policy formulation process, and the NIEs would not in themselves ^{necessarily} lead to selection of a particular policy option.

Finally, I would like to add ^a~~two~~ comment on the specific case dealt with in David Binder's story on Sunday, and other reports derived from it. There has tended to be some confusion in these stories between the experiment which involved a group of outside experts--and which was ~~PART OF A CONTINUING EFFORT~~ intended to identify means of improving the estimative process--and the official NIE prepared by the agencies represented in the intelligence community. It ^{is} important that the judgments of the outside experts not be confused with the official NIE.

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Team "B" Report on Soviet Strategic Objectives

Distribution As of 8/2/68

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

23 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Steadman
Department of Defense Transition Team

1. In accordance with your request to Mr. Bush this morning there is attached for the Secretary of Defense-designate Volume I of NIE 11-3/8-76 as it was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on Tuesday. We apologize for this make-shift copy. The final printed version will be available early in January. Volumes II and III contain supporting analysis; Volume I stands by itself as the complete estimate.

2. I have also attached the "Team B" report on Soviet Strategic Objectives, about which there has been some discussion in the press. In doing so we are stepping outside the rules agreed upon for the competitive analysis experiment between the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the DCI, but Mr. Bush felt that publicity that has occurred makes it appropriate for him to give this to Dr. Brown for his personal use. When the experiment is completed this report will be accompanied by the "A Team's" comments on it, and this, I believe, will give a more balanced picture than one would get from the "B Team" report.

[Redacted Signature]

Richard Lehman
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

Attachments
As stated

cc: DCI
DDCI
D/DCI/IC
NIO/SP

[Redacted Box]

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DDI-5966-76

21 DEC 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

FROM :
Acting Deputy Director
for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Soviet Strategic Objectives: An
Alternative View; Report of
Team B

This is a request for permission to forward
the above subject report to Mr. Robert Gates, DDI
Center for Policy Support. The ODDI has a copy which
we will make available to Mr. Gates if you approve.

CONCUR: *ed*

NIO for Strategic Programs

21 Dec. '76.

Date

MR. GATES has copy # 22.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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National Intelligence Officers

16 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Team B Report on Soviet Strategic Policy and Objectives

1. Attached is the Team B Report on Soviet Strategic Objectives for NFIB consideration. The two other reports--on ICBM accuracy and low altitude air defense--are being prepared in similar format, but are not yet ready for release. These reports, however, have not changed in substance from the original reports of the study groups, and it is these versions which should be used in preparation for the NFIB meeting on Tuesday, 22 December.

2. I want to caution you--on behalf of the Director--that this document is not for dissemination to consumers of intelligence. The intended audience for the next and final step in the experiment is the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Those recipients, together with the Director, will then provide for an overall assessment of the validity and utility of the experiment.

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Richard Lehman
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

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